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1 I NTRODUCTION 
i– mode is a mobile information service offered by DoCoMo in Japan. Based on a 
mobile telephone handset, it enables users to access content from some 82,000 Web sites 
and to run a wide variety of software applications on DoCoMo’s mobile telephone 
network. iPod is a digital music player sold by Apple. It is designed to play music 
downloaded from Apple’s iTunes service using Apple’s QuickTime’s media player. 
i– mode and the iPod are two examples of economically important products based 
in part on computer systems. Every component of computer systems plays a critical role 
in these businesses. The characteristics of the software platform, however, can be the key 
to the viability of a computer system, facilitating the creation of software applications and 
increasing the value to consumers of the integrated system. Moreover, the degree to 
which software platforms are integrated with other components affects many aspects of 
the organization and evolution of computer systems. 
Some software platforms are tightly integrated with the hardware platform—for 
example, Apple Macintosh for personal computers and Sony PlayStation for video games. 
Others are not—for example Windows for personal computers and Symbian for mobile 
phones
1—and, as a result, have facilitated competition among suppliers of the hardware 
platform. Integration between the software platform and software applications has also 
varied. In the early development of video games, manufacturers made the game platform 
as well as the games; today most platform vendors license their platforms to independent 
game developers who generate the bulk of applications. Here, we analyze the business 
dynamics of industries based on computer systems, with special attention to the software 
platform. 
Computer systems are often organized as “multi– sided platform markets.”
2 A 
business is based on a multi– sided platform if it serves two or more distinct types of 
customers who depend on each other in some important way, and whose joint 
participation makes the platform valuable to each.
3 Windows is an example of a three–
                                                 
1 Symbian, however, is made by a joint venture of mobile phone companies. 
2 Rochet and Tirole (2003). Although economists working in this area generally use the term “two– sided” 
and most of their models are indeed two– sided, it is clear that the insights carry over to multi– sided markets. 
Since most of the markets we study in this paper have more than two sides, we will use the term “multi–
sided” whenever it is appropriate. 
3 Rochet and Tirole (2004) use a more formal version of this requirement: for them, a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a market to be two– sided is that the volume of transactions be sensitive to the 
distribution of total costs between the two sides. This implies that a platform can improve upon the market 
outcome through a pricing structure that rebalances costs between the two sides by internalizing (to a    2
sided platform. The platform provides services to application developers, hardware 
manufacturers, and end– users. Each group needs the others to participate if the platform 
is to generate market value. The emerging economics literature on multi– sided platform 
markets provides interesting observations into pricing and business strategies, offering 
insights into the workings of industries based on computer systems.  
It is worth noting, though, that some markets organized around multi– sided 
platforms could be viable as traditional one– sided markets.
4 Firms can choose to integrate 
vertically into the supply of a component rather than relying on the market. For example, 
Apple’s iPod could, in principle, be operated as a multi– sided market platform, but Apple 
has decided to build its business model around a fully integrated single– sided product. 
Apple produces both the hardware and software, and operates its own content– provision 
service for which it buys the content in competition with others. Some of its competitors 
may, however, find that it pays to take a multi– sided approach, creating portals through 
which consumers buy music or other content from third– parties. 
Our survey is organized around case studies of five computer– system– based 
industries: personal computers, video games, personal digital assistants, smart mobile 
phones, and digital content devices. In section 2, we offer some principles for analyzing 
business models in these industries. In section 3, we describe the organization and 
evolution of each of the industries. In section 4, we draw some broad conclusions from 
the case studies, leaving readers with some puzzles to solve. 
2 E CONOMIC AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
A number of forces are driving the proliferation of industries that rely on 
computer systems. Microprocessors have become cheaper, smaller, and more powerful, 
while memory devices have become much less expensive.
5 Today, many products come 
with built– in computer systems complete with microprocessors and operating systems, 
which in some cases are more powerful than the PCs of less than a decade ago.
6 Often, 
                                                                                                                                                 
certain extent) the indirect externalities. This condition implies, but is broader than, the failure of the Coase 
theorem. 
4 Contrast this with, for example, the payment card industry, where it is simply not plausible to imagine the 
integration of the two sides of the business—payers and payees—into a traditional, single– sided market. 
5 Davis et al. (2001). 
6 Typical Pocket PCs available today have processor speeds between 266 and 400 MHz. It was not until 
1997 that Intel released a chip with a clock speed of 233 MHz and not until 1999 that they released a chip 
of 450 MHz. Note, these numbers are not directly comparable due to the differing architectures of the 
systems.     3
these computer systems are integrated with the product and are designed to perform a 
specific set of tasks.
7  
In the markets in which we are interested, the computer system is the core of the 
product and supports a multi– sided market by becoming a focal point for the 
development of complementary products. Smart cards with built– in chips, like the 
American Express Blue card, are examples. Payment card systems have designed these 
cards to encourage the development of applications that can run on them. 
Industries based mainly on computer systems are quite diverse. Nonetheless, they 
share economic and technical features that we summarize in the remainder of this section. 
2.1 Some Technical Observations 
The microprocessor is at the core of a modern computer system.
8 PCs center 
around a microprocessor, a central processing unit that carries out instructions, performs 
computations, and issues commands to the peripheral devices connected to the system. 
Microprocessors control the logic of digital devices ranging from climate control systems 
in office buildings to handheld global– positioning appliances. The operating system is 
equally important to the working of the system. It consists of software code that instructs 
the microprocessor to perform specified tasks, notably controlling and exchanging 
information with hardware. The operating system also enables software developers to 
write applications that use the operating system instructions to interact with the 
microprocessor rather than directly interacting with it themselves.  
Memory is another important category. A variety of mechanical and solid– state 
devices can store anything that can be reduced to digital information, and then make this 
information available to the microprocessor and operating system. 
Software technology has evolved to facilitate the writing of new code for both 
applications programs and operating systems. This technology consists of “high– level” 
languages such as C++. Programs written in these languages can then be “compiled” into 
binary code that gives the microprocessor the digital 0/1 instructions it understands. An 
important source of innovation in computer systems involves developing languages and 
tools that help programmers write applications efficiently. 
                                                 
7 The computer systems embedded in cars, often called engine controllers, provide a familiar example. 
These special– purpose systems are interesting in their own right, but do not raise the sort of business or 
economic issues on which we focus here. 
8 It was not until the early 1970s that microprocessors were invented. Early computers relied on various 
different technologies: in the 1940s, mechanical relays, in the 1950s, vacuum tubes, and in the 1960s, 
memory chips that included hundreds of transistors. Frieberger and Swaine (2000).    4
Software platforms contain modules of code that perform various tasks.
9 These 
modules provide services to be used by other parts of the operating system or by software 
applications. Access to these services is provided through applications program interfaces 
(APIs).  
APIs are conceptually similar to a statistical command like regress(X,Y), where 
the underlying code performs the specified algebraic manipulation on (X,Y) and returns 
results. Like the user of a statistical command, the user of an API does not typically see 
the code underlying the command.  
In some cases, application developers must use APIs to work on a hardware 
platform with a particular microprocessor. In most cases, though, application developers 
use APIs to avoid the tedious process of writing code to perform routine functions. 
Software platforms also serve as interfaces for hardware manufacturers, allowing them to 
finesse the problem of writing code specific to the myriad potential permutations in the 
way systems are configured.
10 
Most operating systems facilitate writing and running applications on the 
underlying hardware, and therefore function as software platforms. However, software 
platforms do not always provide basic, hardware– related operating system services. 
When they do not, they are called “middleware” because they logically sit between the 
operating system and the applications. For example, Java Virtual Machines and the Java 
class libraries provide a platform for applications to run on a variety of hardware and 
operating systems. 
Two other observations are worth making here. First, the development of many of 
the key components of computer systems requires large investments in research and 
development, and embodies significant intellectual capital. An important source of 
protection for software comes from the fact that the code is typically released only in 
                                                 
9 These modules may be in separate files, or many modules may be “linked” together in a single file for 
distribution. 
10 For example, some hardware, including some external DVD drives like the MCE “Superdrive” that 
connects to a computer through an industry– standard interface, is designed only to work with a single 
software platform. This is the case with the Mac; the MacOS shields the drive from the computer’s 
graphics and sound cards, so that a user plugging the drive into a Mac computer need not worry that the 
drive will not function. “MCE Desktop Series External 8x DVD± R/RW FireWire/USB 2.0 ‘SuperDrive’,” 
http://www.mcetech.com/sd8fwusb2– d.html (downloaded 5 July 2004). Other peripherals, such as the 
CanoScan 8000F scanner, use an industry– standard interface to allow the user to connect it to multiple 
platforms, for which Canon has written code to permit such connections. “CanoScan 800F,” 
http://consumer.usa.canon.com/ir/controller?act=ModelDetailAct&fcategoryid=120&modelid=8054 
(downloaded 5 July 2004).    5
binary form, which can only be read by microprocessors. The underlying source code, 
written in a higher– level language, is kept secret in order to prevent the theft of ideas.
11  
Second, there are extensive scale economies in creating some of the key 
components. That is true for microprocessors, where the substantial fixed costs include 
both the construction of specialized plants for fabricating chips and the R&D embodied 
in the design and testing of the chip. The same holds true with a vengeance for software, 
where virtually all the costs come in writing, testing, and debugging the code. What little 
incremental cost there is consists almost entirely of outlays for marketing and 
distribution; the cost of physically reproducing copies of the software is minimal.
12 
2.2 Bundling Components 
Computer systems are comprised of many components. Firms combine these 
components to create products that are ultimately sold or licensed to end– users. The 
contours of these products—what is included or excluded from the bundle of 
components—are determined by business and design decisions.  
The microprocessor, memory, and other components are typically combined to 
create a hardware platform such as a PalmOne Zire PDA, a Nokia mobile phone handset, 
or an Xbox game console. Hardware components that are not included in the physical 
product are termed peripherals and include items such as headphones, pointing devices, 
and printers. Sometimes one model of a product will integrate a specific component, 
while another will not—for example, a pointing device is virtually always integrated into 
a laptop computer but rarely into desktop models.  
With time, many peripherals come to be integrated into the hardware platform. 
Consider the case of the math co– processor, which facilitates number– crunching. Prior to 
the release of Intel’s 486 chip, Intel’s microprocessors did not include a math co–
processor; customers who wanted one purchased it separately from one of several 
vendors at substantial cost. Today, one cannot buy an Intel x86 processor without a built–
in math co– processor.
13 
Similar economic and technological forces are at work in software. Operating 
systems, software platforms, and applications all consist of code that accomplishes 
specific tasks. Where those tasks are accomplished is a matter of business and design 
decisions. And those decisions may vary among competing products as well as between 
                                                 
11 In addition to trade secrets, software is protected by copyright. Some software code can also be patented. 
12 Campbell– Kelly (2003, pp. 209– 212). See also Evans and Schmalensee (2001). 
13 Meuller, Scott and Mark E., “Microprocessor Types and Specifications,” informIT, 8 June 2001.    6
generations of the same product. Many tasks that used to be performed by stand– alone 
applications have become integrated into other applications (e.g., spell checkers, which 
were originally sold separately from word processors) or into the software platform itself. 
Early operating systems, for example, did not include built– in calculators. 
A variety of economic considerations go into the decisions on what to include in a 
product: 
(i)  Integration and coordination benefits. The value of the whole may 
exceed the combined value of the parts. Thus businesses may be 
able to make more competitive products by integrating components. 
Most hardware platforms sold to end– users are, in fact, assembled 
from components purchased from a variety of vendors. 
(ii) Economies of scope. It may be more efficient to produce and 
distribute components as a group rather than separately. The choice 
will depend on the nature of the demand for the components as 
well as the extent of the economies. Evans and Salinger show, for 
example, that when there are fixed costs in offering separate 
products, firms may find it profitable to bundle those products if 
demand for the separate components is lacking.
14 
(iii)Demand aggregation. When there are fixed costs of producing and 
distributing products but low marginal costs in adding components, 
it may be possible to lower costs and reduce variation in 
reservation prices by combining components that appeal to 
different groups of customers.
15 Hardware and software typically 
include many features that most consumers never use. However, 
by including these features vendors expand the number of 
consumers who find the product valuable at the offered price. 
These considerations are not unique to computer systems. They apply to everything from 
newspapers (a bundle of news, arts, lifestyle, and sports content), to cereals (consider 
bran flakes plus raisins), to cars (few come these days without air conditioners and rear 
window defrosters).
16 
                                                 
14 Evans and Salinger (2004). 
15 Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999). Reducing variation in reservation prices enables the seller to capture 
more of the product’s value. 
16 Evans and Salinger (2004b).    7
2.3 Complementarities and Network Effects 
System components are generally complements. Moreover, in many cases, 
systems are characterized by indirect network effects linked to the presence of 
components.
17 That is, an increase in the number of users for one component often makes 
that component more valuable as a complement to the other components.  
For example, as Sony’s Internet– based game center for the Playstation 2 draws 
more users, more Playstation 2 owners will want to buy games supported by the Internet 
service and more consumers will prefer Playstation 2 consoles to competitors’ models. 
Likewise an increase in the variety of components (printers for personal computers, for 
example) often increases the value of other components to end– users. 
There may also be direct network effects. An increase in the number of users for a 
platform makes the platform more valuable to each user—typically because a common 
platform enables people to work together and share information. The “Palm Economy” 
provides another interesting example. The popularity of the PalmOne PDAs attracted 
many developers of small applications and hardware add– ons. There are currently 
thousands of Palm– related products– hence the term Palm Economy– which, of course, 
makes the device more valuable to users.
18 
2.4 Multi– Sided Market Considerations 
The literature on multi– sided markets considers situations in which a platform can 
internalize externalities present among several distinct customer groups.
19 The primary 
means for accomplishing this is to set prices in a way that balances the demand of the 
multiple customer groups (i.e., multiple sides of the market) in order to maximize the 
value of the platform. A key conclusion of this literature is that, because the price 
structure serves to internalize externalities, the price levels for each side do not track 
traditional price– marginal cost relationships.
20 Instead, optimal pricing turns on the 
demand structures and marginal costs of the several sides. Prices on one side may be less 
than marginal cost—even less than zero.
21 
                                                 
17 Katz and Shapiro (1994). 
18 See, for example, “Palmtops/PDAs—PDA Accessories,” http://palmtops.about.com/cs/palmaccessories/ 
(downloaded 16 September 2004). 
19 Rochet and Tirole (2004). 
20 Rochet and Tirole (2003); Armstrong (2002). 
21 Evans (2003).    8
Four types of multi– sided market platform businesses have been identified in the 
literature.
22 Match– makers aid members of one or both sides in their quest for a match on 
the other side (think of real– estate brokers, B2B Web sites, and stock exchanges).
23 
Audience– makers bring advertisers and audiences together, matching buyers and sellers 
(yellow page directories, television, newspapers, magazines, and Internet portals).
24 
Transaction– based businesses meter transactions between the two sides of a market 
(monetary media such as credit cards, advanced– generation mobile phone networks).
25 
The fourth type, shared– input platforms, include the hardware and software 
platforms discussed in this paper. Participants on at least one side need to obtain access to 
the one side to provide value to participants on at least one other side. Thus, software 
developers need to obtain access to the APIs and other features of the software platform 
in order to write applications for end– users. Likewise, software platform designers and 
hardware peripheral manufacturers need access to the functionality of the hardware 
platform to develop products for that platform.
26 
Many of the firms in the computer– based industries examined here are organized 
as multi– sided platforms. However, unlike some other cases, the decision to organize 
computer– based businesses this way seems to be dictated by the same considerations that 
determine whether a firm follows a vertically– integrated or disintegrated business model. 
For example, advertising– supported media cannot vertically integrate into advertising, 
exchanges cannot realistically integrate vertically into the sell– side, and transaction–
based platforms cannot also become sellers. Nor is there a way of providing a general–
purpose payment card without a two– sided model.  
But there is a way of running a computer– system based business in which the firm 
supplies, and perhaps bundles together, all components. In fact, many computer– based 
businesses have adopted this vertically integrated model instead of creating multi– sided 
markets. “Multi– sidedness” is therefore considerably more dependent on the particulars 
of technology and market environment in the computer– based industries than it is in 
many other platform– based businesses.  
                                                 
22 Evans (2003b); Hagiu (2004). 
23 Caillaud and Jullien (2003). 
24 Baye and Morgan (2001) propose a formal model of Internet monopoly "gatekeepers" connecting 
advertisers and consumers.  
25 Rochet and Tirole (2003). 
26 Hagiu (2004).    9
3 C OMPUTER– SYSTEM BASED INDUSTRIES 
This section surveys five diverse, computer– based industries. To avoid getting 
lost in a mass of detail, we focus on two issues related to the degree to which firms have 
chosen to organize themselves as multi– sided platforms. The first of these is the 
structural dynamics of the industry, including how the degree of vertical integration 
varies over time. The second is pricing strategies and their use in exploiting network 
effects. A particular focus here is on businesses that have adopted multi– sided market 
models and on how they have used pricing to “get all sides on board” and to maximize 
the value of their systems. We devote the greatest attention to the computer industry itself, 
and then compare its development with other industries based on computer systems. 
3.1 Computers 
Several sorts of computers have emerged since the first commercial machines 
were introduced in 1951. It is useful to distinguish mainframes, minicomputers, personal 
computers, workstations, and server computers. These sectors have followed diverse 
dynamics and employed different business models over time. We begin with an overview 
of the hardware and software platform relationships, and then focus on personal 
computers. 
3.1.1 Overview 
The vendors of many sorts of computer systems have chosen to provide the 
hardware and software platform together.
27 Most computer mainframe and minicomputer 
companies have produced their own operating systems, which are optimized for the 
computer hardware, and have bundled these operating systems with the hardware 
platform. In these circumstances, software applications can only run on that specific 
hardware and software platform combination.
28  
Some thought that the Unix operating system, introduced by Bell Labs, would 
provide an operating system that worked across different hardware platforms. However, 
                                                 
27 There are other dimensions to decisions on vertical integration not discussed here. For example, one of 
the major differences between personal computers and mainframes is the division between manufacturers 
of microprocessors and the manufacturers of the hardware platforms that are sold to end users.  
28 IBM, for example, developed several operating systems for the computers it introduced in the 1950s and 
1960s beginning with the GM– NAA I/O System for its 704 mainframe in 1956. It developed OS/360 for its 
System/360, which was the leading mainframe– computing platform for many years after its introduction in 
the late 1960s. Recently, IBM has attempted to standardize its various mainframes on the open source 
Linux OS.    10
the computer manufacturers using Unix found that there were advantages to modifying 
the OS to optimize its performance with the underlying hardware.
29 
When personal computers were first introduced in the late 1970s, producers 
generally followed the traditional vertical integration model: firms provided both the 
hardware and software platforms. That is how Apple did it—not to mention Tandy, 
Commodore, Texas Instruments, Coleco, Atari, Timex, and Sinclair.
30 Some vendors 
relied on the CP/M operating system, licensed from Digital Research. But CP/M had to 
be modified for each hardware platform, and applications that ran on one CP/M system 
generally did not work on others.  
When IBM entered the industry in 1981, the company planned to make it possible 
for its hardware platform to work with several operating systems. These included PC–
DOS developed by and licensed from Microsoft, CP/M licensed from Digital Research, 
and the UCSD p– System licensed from Softech.
31 As discussed below, the personal 
computer marketplace soon became a battle between the Apple and IBM platforms. 
Beginning in the 1980s, several companies including Sun and Hewlett Packard 
produced workstations that were designed to perform more processing– intensive tasks 
than most personal computers. These workstations had operating systems based on the 
UNIX or OpenVMS operating systems, but were tightly coupled with a specific hardware 
platform. Vendors typically bundled their hardware and software platforms, much like 
Apple has done in PCs. Microsoft introduced a version of Windows for workstations in 
the early 1990s that ran on the increasingly powerful Intel platform. 
More recently, the development of networked personal computers led to the 
creation of an industry to provide “server computers,” which performed various 
specialized tasks on the network. 
Two business models have coexisted in the workstation and server industries for a 
number of years. Some manufacturers, including Sun, provide integrated hardware and 
software platforms. Several others, notably Microsoft and Novell, license software 
                                                 
29 Campbell– Kelly (2003, pp. 143– 145); See also Salus (1995). 
30 Campbell– Kelly (2003, p. 224). 
31 When IBM released its personal computer, MS– DOS, re– branded PC– DOS when purchased through 
IBM, was the only complete, fast– running OS available for its hardware. The UCSD p– System was 
available but ran very slowly. CP/M– 86 did not become available until 1982, and had the added drawback 
of a hefty price tag—$240, compared to DOS at just $40 when introduced in 1981. Manes and Andrews 
(1994, p. 192).    11
platforms that can be used with Intel– compatible hardware platforms manufactured by 
others. 
3.1.2 Personal Computers 
The choice of business models appears to have had a dramatic effect on the 
evolution of the personal computer industry. Apple bundled its proprietary hardware 
platform with its proprietary software platform. IBM did not. The company offered 
several compatible operating systems developed by third– party vendors and permitted 
vendors to license these operating systems to other hardware vendors. IBM tried to thwart 
the cloning of its hardware platform, but it did not succeed.
32 Microsoft widely licensed 
the operating system it had developed for the IBM PC, which ultimately led to intense 
competition among purveyors of the hardware platform. Despite some experiments with 
licensing its operating system, Apple continued to follow an integrated strategy.
33 
With the benefit of hindsight, one tends to think that Apple’s strategy was foolish 
and Microsoft’s strategy was brilliant. At the time, however, both strategies had 
advantages and disadvantages that left it unclear which strategy would prevail. Apple 
could coordinate the hardware and software platform, realize possible benefits from 
integrating them tightly, and ensure the quality and reliability of the combined system. 
Microsoft, for its part, could benefit from hardware competition and perhaps from 
specializing in what it knew best—writing software. But the company could not test any 
single hardware/operating system combination as intensively as Apple could, and it could 
thus not do as much to ensure overall system quality and reliability. 
The Apple– Microsoft competition is well– trod territory.
34 We consider it here 
only from the perspective of multi– sided markets theory. Microsoft followed a four– sided 
strategy in which it tried to bring hardware platform manufacturers, application 
developers, peripheral manufacturers, and end– users on board its platform. Apple 
initially followed a two– sided strategy in which it marketed to end– users, integrated into 
                                                 
32 The IBM decision in the eighties to make the XT PC specifications public opened up the PC market to 
everybody. Total personal computer sales exploded, but IBM lost share. In 1986, IBM tried to reverse the 
trend by stopping the production of the AT PC and introducing the new Microchannel architecture (MCA). 
Unlike the previous PC specifications, MCA was proprietary and IBM demanded substantial license fees 
for its incorporation in hardware. IBM hoped that its position as a market leader would be enough to turn 
the market in its direction. Vendors, however, largely ignored the MCA and continued to develop the old 
architecture. By the end of the eighties, when IBM quietly abandoned the MCA technology, Compaq was 
the largest maker of PCs. Carrol (1994, pp. 120– 168). 
33 From 1994 to 1997, Apple licensed its operating system to manufacturers of Apple clones. It stopped 
because the licensing revenues gains did not begin to cover the engineering costs.  
34 See, for example, Carlton (1998); Manes and Andrews (1994); Liebowitz and Margolis (2001); Stross 
(1996); and Malone (1998).    12
the hardware platform and peripherals, and tried (though with less gusto than Microsoft) 
to enlist application developers as partners. Apple’s strategy subsequently became three–
sided as it loosened its grip on printers and other peripherals.  
We begin by examining how Microsoft and Apple dealt with the applications side, 
and then turn to how Microsoft has dealt with computer manufacturers. 
3.1.2.1 Software Applications 
From the beginning, the fortunes of the Apple and IBM platforms turned on their 
ability to win over independent applications developers as well as end– users. Both 
platforms took off in part because of “killer apps”—novel applications that enable a task 
that had previously been impossible or too expensive, and thereby drive the adoption of a 
new technology. Apple sales for personal and business use increased rapidly with the 
introduction of VisiCalc, the first commercial spreadsheet program, which was originally 
available exclusively for the Apple II. Likewise, IBM PC sales took off once the Lotus 1–
2– 3 spreadsheet application was released.  
We have found no evidence that these platform providers (Apple, IBM, and 
Microsoft) actively encouraged the creation of the killer apps. Moreover, it appears the 
software platforms at the time played much less important roles in providing services to 
applications than they did later in the history of the personal computer business. VisiCalc 
for the Apple II and Lotus 1– 2– 3 for the IBM PC sometimes even found it more efficient 
to use its own code rather than code embodied in the operating system to perform routine 
tasks. But in later years, Microsoft and Apple realized that, with so much riding on the 
quality of applications available, it made sense to make it as attractive as possible to write 
software for their platforms. 
Most importantly, both expanded the set of APIs providing services to developers. 
This was especially apparent at Microsoft as it moved its software platform from DOS to 
Windows. According to Bill Gates, Windows XP exposes more than 6,000 APIs for 
developers through its Win 32 API set.
35 Apple has also created an extensive set of APIs 
for the convenience of its developers. Indeed, it has split these APIs into Cocoa, a set of 
high– level functions that developers can use to write complex applications using very 
little code, and Carbon, a class of fine– grain procedural APIs.
36 
                                                 
35 Direct Testimony of Bill Gates, 18 April 2002 in State of New York v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 98–
1233 (CKK). 
36 Apple’s Developer Connection Web site, “An Introduction to Mac OS X Development Technologies,” 1 
June 2004, http://developer.apple.com/macosx/introdevtech.html (downloaded 3 September 2004).    13
Both launched programs for “evangelizing” their respective software platforms 
among developers, with Apple taking the lead in the early 1980s.
37 According to Guy 
Kawasaki, the greatest Apple software evangelist: 
The secondary effects of getting people to believe, who then got more 
people to believe, is something that was stumbled upon. In my 
recollection, I was never told, ‘OK, you go get XYZ to write software, and 
they in turn will get more customers to buy your software and to buy 
Macs. That’s what happened, but that was not the plan.
38 
In 1984, shortly after Apple’s introduction of the evangelist role, Microsoft 
formed the Developer Relations Group (DRG) to drum up support from third– party 
application developers for the first release of Windows.
 39 DRG’s mission was to “Drive 
the success of Microsoft’s strategic platforms by creating a critical mass of third– party 
applications.” By 1995, DRG had over 85 employees in the United States and many more 
in the rest of the world.
40 Their evangelism process is well defined, and is broken out into 
four steps that focus on choosing which technologies to evangelize and working one– on–
one to support early adopters.
 41  
Both platforms now provide benefits to software developers at little cost. In fact, 
both platforms have developer networks that offer online assistance at no cost through 
their developer Web sites. Members of these networks receive newsletters, 
documentation, software seeds, system software, and software development kits.
42  
According to a 1995 Microsoft white paper, the company has long been 
committed to supporting third– party development: 
Microsoft has its roots in developer support. The company was founded to 
develop languages and tools for PC application developers. As developers 
themselves, Microsoft’s early employees understood the difficulties of 
supporting product on the multiplicity of operating systems that existed in 
the late 1970 and early 1980s. One of their key interests in MS– DOS was 
to try to create a broadly popular platform that would greatly simplify their 
own development process. In recognizing that, the company also realized 
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that it needed to marshal other developers and hardware vendors to create 
a critical mass of support for MS– DOS.
43 
As of 1995, Microsoft was spending about $65 million annually to support 
software developers, and had about 400 technical support engineers on staff. By 1998, 
Microsoft was spending over $250 million annually on developer– related activities that 
included research, events, marketing assistance, training programs, product support, and 
publications.
44 In January 1999, Paul Maritz, the Group Vice President of Platforms and 
Applications at Microsoft, testified that Microsoft was planning to spend $630 million to 
help software developers write applications, and that 2,000 of Microsoft’s 27,000 
employees work full time in helping developers.
45 
It is obvious that Apple and Microsoft would benefit from stimulating the 
production of applications. It is less obvious that the profit– maximizing strategy involved 
giving away developer services. The application developers, after all, were getting 
something of value from the software platforms: by writing for these platforms, they 
could market their applications to businesses and individuals using Apple or IBM–
compatible computers. By 1990, Microsoft had 71 million users worldwide and Apple 
had 5 million users worldwide.
46 Therefore, both Apple and Microsoft could, in theory, 
have charged for access to their APIs and for the other platform services for developers, 
once they had established a substantial user base. And, in fact, that is just what makers of 
video game platforms did. (See Section 3.2 below). 
In addition to persuading third parties to write applications, both Apple and 
Microsoft created applications for their own software platforms.
47 As of 1999, Microsoft 
applications represented about 20 percent of the sales of applications for its own platform, 
while Apple had a 10 percent share of applications for its platform.
48 
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3.1.2.2 Hardware 
Apple and Microsoft differed in how they treated the hardware platform. Apple 
began as an integrated hardware and platform company. Its first computer, the Apple I, 
was introduced in 1976 and came with a firmware resident system monitor that allowed 
the user to display, write, debug, and run programs. Except for a brief flirtation with 
licensing clone manufacturers in the mid 1990s, Apple has always bundled its hardware 
and software platforms.  
Bill Gates did send a now– famous letter to Apple’s CEO John Sculley and Apple 
Products President Jean– Louis Gassée in 1985 in which he argued that Apple should 
license its operating system software to other manufacturers. Gates advised Apple to 
consider licensing the MacOS in order to “create a standard,” stating that the “significant 
investment (especially independent support) in a ‘standard personal computer’ results in 
incredible momentum for its architecture.”
49  
Gates’ counsel was not altruistic. Microsoft had a financial interest in the success 
of Apple because, as noted above, it was a major supplier of applications for the Apple 
platform.
50 But many observers argue that Apple’s failure to follow his advice 
contributed to Apple’s loss of share to the open Microsoft platform. It is hard to know for 
sure. After all, much of the appeal of Apple computers is the seamless integration of its 
hardware and software, and a three– sided model might not have done as well. 
Microsoft started as a software company focused on programming languages and 
only began working with operating systems when it was commissioned by IBM to do 
so.
51 In its agreement with IBM, Microsoft reserved the right to license the operating 
system to other companies. And soon after the IBM PC had established itself as a serious 
contender in the emerging personal computer industry, Microsoft started working with 
other computer manufacturers who were developing IBM clones. It is generally accepted 
that the ensuing competition with IBM helped reduce the price of IBM– compatible PCs, 
thus increasing total PC output and expanding the demand for Microsoft’s operating 
systems. 
In some respects, Microsoft is the tail that wags the proverbial PC dog. Computer 
manufacturers install copies of MS– DOS (and later Windows) on their computers before 
shipping them to end– users, and end– users are made aware that their PCs have Microsoft 
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operating systems installed.
52 Manufacturers pay license fees to Microsoft based on the 
number of personal computers they ship with Microsoft operating systems installed. As 
in any manufacturer– distributor relationship, these license fees are based largely on the 
ultimate demand by end– users for Microsoft’s operating systems; for the computer 
manufacturers, Microsoft’s operating systems are a cost that is passed on in whole or in 
part to end– users. 
In fact, the relationship between Microsoft and the computer manufacturers has 
been more complicated than the preceding paragraph suggests. Microsoft, Intel, and the 
major computer vendors have worked with each other (and often with peripheral 
manufacturers) to prepare new products; in the early days, in particular, the process was 
driven by advances in microprocessors. Microsoft worked with the computer 
manufacturers both to make sure that its operating system worked well with the next 
generation of hardware and to ensure that the next generation of hardware made use of 
features that Microsoft was developing for its operating system. Over time, Microsoft has 
created pricing incentives for the inclusion of hardware features that made Microsoft’s 
operating systems more useful. 
Microsoft provided services to computer manufacturers and makers of peripherals 
in several ways. In the early days of DOS, any developer that wanted its application to 
work with, say, a large set of printers already in use had to customize its application for 
each printer. If there are N applications and M peripherals in use, in order for every 
program to interact with every peripheral, N*M drivers would have to be written. 
With the transition to Windows, however, application programs needed only 
include a single general Windows driver for each type of peripheral (printer, scanner, 
etc.) and device manufacturers needed only write Windows drivers to make use of their 
device’s features; the operating system linked them together.
53 Thus, thanks to Windows, 
in order for every program to communicate with every device, only N+M drivers had to 
be written. Microsoft continued to put a lot of effort into making it easier for 
manufacturers of peripheral equipment to write for their operating system. For example, 
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when Windows 95 was released, the platform supported over 800 different printers right 
out of the box.
54 
Another example of Microsoft’s contribution to the development of hardware 
peripherals is the company’s collaboration in the development of the CD– ROM. In 1986, 
prior to even having a CD– ROM product in the works, Gates insisted that Microsoft 
associate itself with CD technology by holding a CD– ROM conference.
55 The conference 
was a success and Gates decided to make it an annual event. Gates recognized that to 
exploit the technology fully, Microsoft would need to acquire new skills, and he was not 
convinced that a viable business was possible in this arena. In fact, Gates told a colleague 
that he was willing to invest $200 million to find out if a profitable market existed for the 
CD technology.
56  
To jump– start the industry, Microsoft worked with representatives from Sony, 
Phillips, Digital Research, Apple, and others to accelerate the establishment of a single 
file format.
57 Microsoft also evangelized the “religion of CD– ROM” by convincing 
hardware companies to offer personal computers with pre– installed and configured CD–
ROM drives in addition to add– on external drives.
58  
Apple has followed a very different path with respect to peripherals. Because the 
IBM PC is an open platform with no single vendor controlling the standard, anybody can 
produce peripherals to work with any PC. By contrast, Apple exercised significant 
control over its system. The company manufactured and sold it own peripherals—
opening the platform to others, the thinking went, would cut into Apple revenues. As a 
result, Apple was usually late to include industry– standard ports and mostly relied on its 
own peripherals.
59 For example, the market for third– party Mac monitors did not exist 
until 1987. Even today, many Macintosh computers house the monitor and the computer 
core in a single unit.
60 Note, too, that the very first Mac was designed to make expansion 
as hard as possible. It included a bar above its few ports in order to make expansion 
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difficult. What’s more, the cover was difficult to remove—the better to discourage users 
from opening it.
61  
Even after Apple opened the Macintosh to third– party peripheral manufacturers, it 
retained a significant advantage for its own equipment through the tight integration of the 
Macintosh with Apple– made peripherals. For example, at the end of the 1980s, Apple 
remained virtually the only supplier of printers for the Macintosh platform; not 
surprisingly, 95 percent of the printers attached to Macintoshes were made by Apple.
62 
3.1.2.3 Pricing Structures 
Multi– sided market theory is built on the premise that pricing is a critical element 
in any strategy to maximize platform value. Microsoft has earned virtually all of its 
revenue from end– users—either directly through the retail channel, or indirectly through 
computer manufacturers who pass on the licensing charges to end– users. It has given 
away access to its APIs as well as to other valuable services for writing applications, and 
thus earned only minor revenue from licensing software tools. It has also given away 
valuable services to computer manufacturers and hardware peripheral manufacturers.
63 
Apple has adopted a similar pricing structure, though as noted before, it has vertically 
integrated the production of hardware. 
3.2 Video Games 
The video game industry has been remarkably dynamic since its birth, starting 
with Pong in 1975. Comparing its evolution with that of computers provides useful 
insights concerning choices of structure and business models. 
3.2.1 Evolution of business models 
Video game consoles were introduced in the 1970s as devices that played a single 
game that was hardwired into the console’s circuitry. The most successful ones were 
versions of already popular Arcade games, such as Atari’s Home Pong (1975) and 
Coleco’s Telestar (1976). With the release of Fairchild’s Channel F game console in 1976, 
a new business model emerged. Channel F did not hardwire games, but rather played 
games stored in interchangeable cartridges. Atari expanded on Fairchild’s approach with 
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the release of the Video Computer System (VCS) in 1977.
64 Neither Fairchild nor Atari 
moved quickly to write contracts for new games with independent developers, but they 
did establish the technological separation of the hardware platform and the game 
software.
65 
A new dimension of the business model started taking shape in 1980. Some Atari 
programmers defected to found Activision, the first independent software company in the 
home video game market.
66 The company’s initial goal was to create games for the VCS 
model 2600. Activision soon released its first games and was an overnight success. That 
encouraged other startups in independent game production, which represented a turning 
point for the industry. From then on, a manufacturer entering the console market had to 
attract both gamers and developers to the platform to ensure its success. 
Today’s platform business model originated with the introduction of Nintendo’s 
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) in the mid– 1980s. Nintendo actively pursued 
licensing agreements with game publishers in order to support the NES, and was the first 
console maker to introduce a security chip that locked out unlicensed games. Both 
practices have been since adopted by virtually all console manufacturers. 
Just as computer operating systems must attract applications software and users to 
succeed, video game platforms must attract game publishers and gamers: in this sense, 
both markets are two– sided. Platform competition in the video game industry is 
extremely fierce: a new round of competition takes place every 4– 5 years when new 
models are released; the two most successful platforms typically end up with more than 
80 percent of the market, and one platform generally achieves clear dominance.
67 
Moreover, 50 percent of console sales come within 3 months of the introduction of a new 
model, and fully 80 percent within 9 months.
68 Thus a platform either succeeds or flops 
quickly, and platform owners understand that having a solid library of games available at 
launch is a necessary condition for success. 
3.2.2 Attracting game developers 
It is interesting to compare the personal computer application industry and the 
game publishing industry. Both came into being in order to exploit the popularity of the 
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early platforms in their respective industries, the Apple II and the Atari VCS. Moreover, 
killer applications have played important roles in both industries. It is noteworthy, 
however, that unlike killer apps for PCs, virtually all killer games have been produced by 
console makers themselves—Pong (Atari), Mario Bros and Pokemon (Nintendo), and 
Sonic the Hedgehog (Sega). Note, too, that although the video game industry had become 
two– sided by the 1985 release of NES in the United States, first– party (or in– house) 
games continued to account for a large share of total games developed for consoles as 
late as 1995. In that year, Nintendo was still developing 57 percent of Nintendo 64 
software in– house.
69 
The first console to break with this tradition was Sony’s Playstation, for which 
only 23 percent of the games were developed in– house.
70 Neither the original Playstation 
nor its successor, Playstation II, could boast of any killer game in the sense Sonic and 
Mario had been killer games for Genesis and NES respectively. Instead, Playstation 
achieved supremacy by attracting the support of game companies that developed a wide 
variety of popular offerings. 
Key to Playstation’s popularity with game developers were Sony’s excellent 
development tools, which earned its platform a reputation for being very easy to program 
in comparison to Nintendo’s Nintendo 64 and Sega’s Saturn.
71 Furthermore, Sony made 
life easier for developers by opting to store games on CD– ROMs, while Nintendo 
continued to use cartridges. CD– ROMs were substantially cheaper to make in quantity 
than cartridges,
72 and the medium also allowed for much faster adjustments in production 
to meet changes in demand.
73 These two factors enabled Sony to earn the same per– unit 
profit as Nintendo while charging substantially lower licensing fees.
74 
The importance of developer support in the video game industry, as in the 
computer industry, became clear when Microsoft launched the Xbox console in 2001. 
The company announced two programs, the Independent Developer Program and the 
Incubator Program, to encourage smaller developers by providing free software tools and 
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waiving normal pre– publishing requirements.
75 Furthermore, Microsoft had extensive 
meetings with developers before the hardware specs for the console were set and 
incorporated many of their suggestions into the final design. Microsoft also made it easier 
for developers with PC experience to develop games for the Xbox by relying on DirectX 
(a collection of Windows APIs that serves as the foundation for most PC games) in the 
design of the console. 
3.2.3 Hardware 
In contrast with personal computers, the hardware platform has remained tightly 
integrated with the software platform in the video game industry. Console makers design 
their own operating systems to take advantage of technological advances in hardware. It 
is also noteworthy that the most recent consoles contain operating systems whose 
functionality extends beyond simple support for video games. For example, the recently 
released Playstation X (PSX) includes a DVD player and Internet connectivity.
76 
3.2.4 Pricing structures 
Perhaps the most interesting contrast with the personal computer industry is the 
pricing structure adopted by game console manufacturers. The pricing model that 
emerged with the NES in the mid– 1980s (and is still prevalent today) is based on selling 
the console to end– users at (or below) the marginal cost of production. Console makers 
then rely on revenue from games produced in– house along with royalties from games 
sold by independent developers to recover fixed development costs.
77 In multi– sided 
market jargon, users pay a direct access fee for the right to access the platform—but a fee 
that is less than the marginal cost of serving them.  
Developers pay no access fees. Their access is, in fact, subsidized through the 
provision of numerous development tools at little or no cost. But they are charged usage 
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fees in the form of royalties that depend on the number of end– users who buy their 
games.
78 This pricing model is the exact opposite of the one used by computer software 
platforms—a fact that is all the more remarkable since video game consoles are 
technologically equivalent to computer operating systems integrated with a hardware 
platform. 
3.3 Personal Digital Assistants 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) provide users with electronic applications 
such as address books, calendars, schedule organizer, memo– writing capabilities, etc. 
Like computers, PDAs are based on a software platform—the best– known and most 
widely used being the Palm OS. Palm’s history and business strategies are well 
documented elsewhere.
79 We therefore focus on elements directly relevant to software 
platforms. 
3.3.1 Evolution of business models 
The Palm Pilot, introduced in 1996, was not the first PDA. It was the first to 
achieve widespread popularity, however: after selling 360,000 units in its first year, Palm 
reached cumulative sales of 2 million in 1998 and 18 million in 2002. 
The first Palm was a fully integrated device for consumers, integrating the 
hardware, an operating system, and a major application. Its early success seems to have 
been linked to ease– of– use, low prices,
80  good handwriting recognition, and PC 
connectivity. Subsequently, Palm’s popularity with users attracted a large community of 
developers of complementary software and hardware,
81 which Palm actively encouraged 
and which has become known as the Palm Economy. Thus, much like video game 
consoles and PCs, Palm evolved from a one– sided, consumer product into a two– sided 
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market platform. The process took just two years, compared to 10 years for video games 
and close to three decades for the computer industry.
82 
The next step in Palm’s platform strategy was to license the Palm operating 
system to manufacturers of other consumer devices, most importantly cell phones. Then, 
starting in 2000, Palm decided to start licensing the Palm OS to competing handheld 
manufacturers. The goal was to expand the user base of its operating system platform, 
whose dominance had begun to come under pressure from Microsoft’s Pocket PC OS. 
Thus, although Palm allowed the cloning of its hardware platform, it kept the 
development of the software platform in– house. 
In 2003, Palm split into PalmSource, its operating system– division which 
continues to license the Palm OS to a broad range of handheld devices (including smart–
phones), and PalmOne, the hardware division, which at the same time acquired rival 
hardware maker Handspring
83. 
3.3.2 Complements: applications and hardware add– ons 
Graffiti, Palm’s hand– recognition application, is generally regarded as the killer 
application that drove adoption of the Pilot, much like VisiCalc drove the success of the 
Apple II. It made PDAs popular because it gave users an easy and appealing way to enter 
data into their address– books, to write short memos, etc. 
However, Graffiti was produced in– house, like virtually all early applications for 
the Palm. Although Palm’s founders were fully aware of its potential to become a 
software platform at the outset, the Pilot was initially conceived as a vertically integrated 
consumer device. This strategy reflected lessons learned from the early failures in the 
PDA business
84 and the initial difficulties encountered in attracting independent 
developers.  
Palm held its first developer conference in late 1997.
85 Since then, it has been 
aggressively involved in the development of the Palm Economy, with efforts in this 
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direction very similar to Microsoft’s. Like any computer operating system vendor, Palm 
realized that more software and hardware complements make devices running the Palm 
OS more attractive, and therefore allow Palm to sell more copies of the operating system. 
Palm helped its developer community stabilize interface standards and facilitated 
business and technical exchanges among them. For example, Palm worked with five 
other firms to found the SyncML Initiative, aimed at developing a standard open protocol 
for data synchronization. The company also regularly offered Palm OS development 
classes, and it encouraged other activities among its community of users through 
developer portals.
86 In addition, Palm provided business resources to developers, 
including joint development, marketing, and bundling. The most important resources 
offered were its software development forums, which helped third– party developers start 
their own businesses. Palm even created a $50 million venture capital unit called Palm 
Ventures to support businesses focusing on Palm OS applications. Today, PalmGear, the 
leading Internet provider of software and hardware products for the Palm OS platform, 
offers more than 22,000 applications.
87 
3.3.3 Hardware platform 
Initially, Palm sold a fully integrated consumer device. But after recognizing that 
most of the value of its platform resided in the operating system, it chose to license it to 
manufacturers of other hardware including competing PDA makers—among them 
Handspring, Sony, IBM, Qualcomm, and Supra.  
3.3.4 Pricing structure 
Given the similarity of the relationship between Palm and the Palm Economy to 
the one between Microsoft and the PC applications industry, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the Microsoft and Palm platform pricing structures are virtually identical. Software 
and hardware developers are charged little or nothing for support from Palm, and there 
are no variable fees parallel to the royalties collected in the video game industry.
88 Palm’s 
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revenues come from licensing its operating system to device vendors and from direct sale 
of its own devices.
89 
3.4 Smart Mobile Phones 
The market for smart phones has exploded during the past two years; indeed, in 
2003, sales of smart phones overtook those of PDAs.
90 Smart phones are the most 
sophisticated category of wireless devices, possessing advanced capabilities and data 
services (calendar, address book, computer– like applications, wireless access to content, 
etc.),
91 as well as mobile phone capacities. The leading software platform for smart–
phones is the Symbian operating system,
92 on which we focus here. 
3.4.1 Evolution of business model 
Symbian was established as an independent software licensing company in June 
1998 by Motorola, Ericsson, Nokia, and Psion (a PDA vendor), with the goal of creating 
a common operating system for wireless information devices based on Psion’s EPOC 32 
OS.
93 Subsequently, Matsushita (owner of the Panasonic brand), Sanyo, Sony, Fujitsu, 
Siemens, and Samsung all became Symbian licensees, and some of them also became 
Symbian shareholders. The majority of Symbian’s shareholders are among the top 10 
handset vendors. 
3.4.2 Applications 
Initially most Symbian applications were developed in– house and distributed to 
its hardware licensees, or directly developed and installed by the hardware licensees 
themselves. Symbian provides its licensees with customizable user interfaces, which 
allow them to differentiate their products, as well as color support and advanced Internet 
connectivity.
94 Handset manufacturers integrate the Symbian OS with their hardware and 
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(downloaded 16 September 2004). 
93 “Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia & Psion Create Symbian Alliance,” Newsbytes, 24 June 1998. 
94 “Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia & Psion Create Symbian Alliance,” Newsbytes, 24 June 1998.     26
sometimes their own applications, and then market their mobile phones through network 
operators such Vodafone and T– Mobile. 
However, as mobile phone capabilities developed, a market for third– party 
applications for smart phones emerged and expanded spectacularly, with products 
ranging from productivity applications (communication, data and file management) to 
entertainment (games, media players). The number of Symbian applications offered by 
third– party vendors rose from 1,323 to 2,954 between 2003 and 2004.
95 Noteworthy 
examples include Access’ NetFront browser, RealNetworks’ Mobile RealPlayer and 
Macromedia’s Flash Player for Symbian OS. 
Symbian seems to have succeeded in creating a “Symbian Economy” similar to 
the Palm Economy. The company supports this economy very actively. Through its Web 
site, Symbian offers SDKs, programming languages (Java, C++, OPL,
96 and Visual 
Basic), development tools, APIs and documentation to independent developers. It also 
holds industry– wide events
97 and even organizes application contests.
98 In addition, 
Symbian relies heavily on joint efforts in making improvements to its platform, setting up 
a partnership initiative in 2002 “to promote the creation of innovative software and 
hardware technology solutions.”
99 It also develops/licenses products with/from software 
companies including Oracle (wireless access to data residing in Oracle databases), IBM 
(wireless enterprise applications for users of Symbian– based smart phones and 
communicators), Sybase (SQL anywhere and UltraLite deployment technology for smart 
phones), Metrowerks (CodeWarrior software development tools), Infomatrix (file format 
converters for MS Office e– mail attachments), Opera Software (Opera browser), 
RealNetworks (RealPlayer Mobile), and ARM (Jazelle technology software). 
                                                 
95 “Symbian H1 2004 results,” http://www.symbian.com/press– office/2004/pr040804.html (downloaded 14 
September 2004). 
96 Open Programming Language. 
97 Symbian Feature, “At the Heart of Smartphone Evolution,” 11 March 2002, 
http://www.symbian.com/news/2002/devexpo– feat.html (downloaded 15 August 2003); “Symbian 
Exposium03—Invitation to Press,” 10 April 2003, http://www.symbian.com/press–
office/2003/pr030410.html (downloaded 15 August 2003). 
98 Symbian Press Release, “Nokia names top Symbian applications globally,” 15 April 2002, 
http://www.symbian.com/news/2002/pr020415b.html (downloaded 16 September 2004). 
99 Symbian Press Release, “Symbian opens its source code to third party software and hardware 
developers,” 23 April 2002, http://www.symbian.com/press– office/2002/pr020423.html (downloaded 4 
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3.4.3 Hardware 
What sets Symbian apart from all other software platforms is its status as a joint 
venture by competing mobile phone handset manufacturers. No such entity exists in any 
other industry. In fact, it is interesting to note the stark contrast in platform strategy 
compared to Windows CE, Symbian’s main competitor in the market for smart– phone 
operating systems. Microsoft’s approach has been to partner with low– cost original 
design manufacturers (ODMs) to produce Windows– powered, network– operator– specific 
phones,
100 thereby bypassing the brand– name handset makers.
101 The idea is to 
commoditize the hardware and make the industry revolve around a proprietary software 
platform controlled by the operating system vendor and the telecom network operator. 
That, of course, is similar to the way the PC industry has evolved, with the operator 
playing a similar role to that of the microprocessor manufacturer (i.e. Intel) in PCs. This 
platform would have three sides: users, application developers, and hardware makers. In 
contrast, leading hardware makers would like to see the software commoditized instead—
which is why Symbian champions open standards—and have the industry revolve around 
hardware platforms that share an open software platform not controlled by any one firm. 
This platform would be two– sided: users and application developers. The model 
resembles the PC industry before the emergence of the IBM PC and DOS, with CP/M as 
a more or less open software platform that hardware manufacturers could customize and 
integrate into their machines. 
3.4.4 Pricing structure 
Symbian’s pricing structure is very similar to the ones adopted by PalmSource 
and the software platforms in the computer industry. Symbian invests considerable effort 
and financial resources in developer support, but application developers pay little if 
anything in return. Symbian then receives royalties
102 on each Symbian OS– based phone 
shipped by hardware licensees, as well as consulting fees for helping licensees implement 
the Symbian OS. Thus, there are no usage fees, negative access fees for developers, and, 
                                                 
100 The best example of this approach is France’s Orange operator, which sells phones built by HTC, one of 
many Taiwanese ODMs, and running Windows. In September 2003, Microsoft finally managed to engage 
one big handset maker, though not exclusively: Motorola will base its MPx200 phone on Windows CE, but 
it continued licensing Symbian and using its own OS, MotoJUIX. See “The Third Way,” The Economist, 
18 September 2003. 
101 It is noteworthy that the latter also use ODMs extensively, by outsourcing parts of their manufacturing 
processes. 
102 From Symbian OS v7.0 onwards, the royalty has been set at $7.25 per unit for the first 2 million units 
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assuming royalties charged to hardware licensees get passed on to consumers, positive 
access fees for end– users. 
3.5 Digital Content Devices 
As the Internet and wireless telecommunications networks have become faster 
and capable of transmitting larger chunks of data, the market for digital content has 
expanded greatly. Access to digital content—including music, multimedia clips, and 
games—is controlled by software platforms, which provide the technology that enables 
users to “consume” the content. 
At this early stage of development, different digital content platforms have 
adopted different business models. In particular, Apple’s iPod is a one– sided consumer 
product, while NTT DoCoMo’s i– mode is a two– sided platform, and Real’s RealPlayer is 
something of a mix of the two. Here we consider these platforms, focusing on the first 
two. 
3.5.1 Description 
Apple’s iPod is a portable digital device for listening to music stored in Apple’s 
AAC digital format. A regular iPod can hold 5,000 songs on average, which users can 
purchase and download via the Internet at Apple’s online music store, iTunes. 
i– mode is a “third– generation” mobile– phone service introduced by NTT 
DoCoMo in 1999
103 that is still the market leader in Japan. It is an always– on wireless 
service, which allows consumers equipped with i– mode– powered handsets to exchange 
e– mails and access a wide variety of content—including news, personal finance, games, 
and ring– tones—through i– mode’s portal. 
3.5.2 Content provision 
Perhaps the most interesting difference between these two is their relationship 
with content providers. iPod delivers music
104 from the iTunes music store, an online 
shop run by Apple, where consumers buy songs for 99 cents individually (or entire 
albums for $9.99), which they download onto their computer, manage using the iTunes 
software and Quicktime media player, and then transfer to the iPod portable device.
105 
Rights to distribute the approximately one million songs available on iTunes have been 
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104 At least for now. There is speculation that future versions will include games and other applications. 
105 Songs come wrapped in Apple’s digital rights management (DRM) technology. The DRM is intended to 
limit the use of AAC files to the QuickTime media player (installed on the user’s computer), iTunes and the 
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purchased by Apple from record labels, which receive a percentage of revenues for songs 
downloaded. Thus, Apple’s iPod/iTunes business model is no different from that of 
supermarkets, which must first acquire supplies before selling them to consumers. 
By contrast, none of the content that users can access through the i– mode portal is 
owned in any sense by DoCoMo. The company simply provides a digital interface 
through which users and content providers interact. This business model is two– sided, as 
the value of the service to users depends on the variety of content available (i.e. the 
number of content providers signed up) and the value to content providers depends on the 
number of subscribers to i– mode. It is noteworthy that two– sidedness was one of the 
major strategic differences between i– mode and another early failed attempt in the 3G 
market, Vizzavi, which relied exclusively on its own content.
106 Two of the main reasons 
behind i– mode’s success in attracting content providers
107 were the choice of the c–
HTML language over WAP (wireless application protocol), which greatly reduced costs 
for providers already possessing an Internet Web site, and the creation of an advanced 
billing system enabling content providers to charge small monthly fees to users. 
3.5.3 Hardware 
Apple’s iPod– iTunes business model is vertically integrated, with Apple 
providing both the software (Quicktime and iTunes) and the hardware (iPod). By contrast, 
handsets designed specifically for i– mode are supplied by a number of manufacturers 
with close relationships to DoCoMo—in particular Matsushita (owner of the Panasonic 
brand), NEC, Fujitsu, and Sharp. 
3.5.4 Pricing structure 
As explained above, Apple’s iPod– iTunes business model is one– sided, so there 
is nothing unusual about it. Like any other merchant, Apple buys music from record 
labels and resells it to users, along with the iPod device. According to most analysts, 
Apple barely breaks even on the music part of the business, making its money on the 
hardware/software bundle. 
The i– mode pricing structure issue is more interesting. DoCoMo does not charge 
fixed fees to content providers for making their content accessible through i– mode, even 
though there are reportedly hundreds of new providers queuing up every month for this 
privilege. It charges relatively modest subscription fees to users (including significant 
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handset subsidies) but uses its sophisticated billing system to charge them variable fees 
based on their intensity of content usage.
108 Furthermore, it offers content providers the 
option of joint billing (which makes life easier for everyone, since consumers receive a 
single unified bill) in exchange for 9 percent of the content revenues. 
4 R EGULARITIES AND PUZZLES 
The four, computer– based industries surveyed here have notable similarities, as 
well as striking differences that give rise to interesting puzzles—some of which we 
highlight in this concluding section. 
4.1 Integration and Multi– sidedness 
Within individual industries, we have seen significant differences in the extent of 
integration across companies and over time. The less integration, generally the greater the 
extent of multi– sidedness, the greater the complexity of the task of “getting all sides on 
board,” and the more the market is relied upon to lower cost and improve quality. On the 
other hand, greater integration provides greater control over the total system as 
experienced by the end– user. 
One can see a broad tendency toward less integration over time in these industries, 
reflecting the development of markets that can be relied upon for low– cost, high– quality 
complementary products. For example, the early video game console manufacturers 
wrote their own games and operating systems—nobody else was going to do it. A robust 
industry of game developers has since emerged, and console vendors have found it useful 
to rely more on the market to supply desired games. They have moved from offering a 
consumer product to a two– sided platform.  
Similarly, in the absence of a capable set of outside suppliers, Palm initially wrote 
all the applications for its PDA and sold a software platform/hardware 
platform/applications bundle as a consumer product. As outside applications suppliers 
developed, Palm moved to a two– sided strategy relying in part on their efforts. Currently, 
the Palm Economy also includes independent suppliers of hardware platforms and 
peripherals, and PalmSource was spun off to focus tightly on its software platform, the 
Palm OS. 
Computers offer the most extreme example of this sort of evolution. Early users 
of mainframe computers bought the hardware platform, operating system, applications, 
and peripherals from the same firm. As the mainframe computer industry matured after 
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the introduction of the IBM System/360, independent vendors of applications and 
peripherals emerged. By the time the IBM PC was introduced in 1981, there were 
numerous independent software applications vendors. Today, Microsoft’s Windows 
software platform plays a central role in personal computers. But Microsoft is not 
integrated into hardware platforms, and it is one of many vendors of applications 
programs and, to a very minor extent, peripherals (mice, keyboards) that work with the 
Windows platform.  
Some important differences in integration within industries reflect differences in 
business strategies, which in turn reflect different perceptions of competitive advantage 
and/or market trends. The differences between Apple and Microsoft are classic. Apple’s 
greater integration facilitated delivery of quality and reliability, and eased the task of 
coordinating changes in hardware and operating systems. Microsoft’s reliance on a 
competitive market for hardware led to both hardware innovation and low hardware 
prices—and, with hindsight, this seems to have been the better business strategy. As the 
creator of the leading handset manufacturers, Symbian’s strategy aims toward a smart–
phone industry with a cheap, open software platform and differentiated hardware 
platforms. By contrast, software platform vendor Microsoft aims to create a PC– like 
smart– phone industry in which relatively undifferentiated hardware platforms all use a 
proprietary software platform. In setting up iPod, Apple made a choice to distribute only 
content it owned, while NTT DoCoMo chose to own none of the content that flows 
through its i– mode system. Purely as a technical matter, each could have made the other 
choice. 
4.2 Pricing Strategies 
As noted at the outset, most vendors of multi– sided platforms seem to earn the 
bulk of their profits from only one side. This is itself something of a puzzle. The pattern 
characterizes all the industries we have discussed here. In PCs and PDAs, all the money 
is earned from end– users. Neither Palm nor Apple nor Microsoft (in either sector) 
charges applications writers or peripherals manufacturers for the right to access to its 
software platform. In fact, all expend resources to facilitate access. Microsoft profits by 
licensing its operating systems to end– users through hardware manufacturers; Apple 
profits by selling hardware/software bundles to end– users. The two companies created 
from the original Palm Computing collectively employ both channels. 
As we have noted, pricing strategies in the video game industry are dramatically 
different. Video game platforms are sold to end– users as integrated bundles of hardware 
and operating systems, but these sales yield little or no profit. As with personal computers,    32
video game platform vendors subsidize access by applications (i.e., game) developers. In 
stark contrast with personal computers, however, game developers pay platform vendors 
fees for use of the platform in the form of royalties for each game sold.  
When pricing strategies differ so sharply between industries using broadly similar 
technologies and integration strategies but are nearly identical within those industries, it 
seems clear that industry– level cost and/or demand differences (rather than, say, firm–
level differences or strategic choices) are playing the leading role in shaping strategies. 
As noted, however, the literature does not yet contain a rigorous explanation of the 
differences in pricing between PCs and PDAs, on the one hand, and videogames on the 
other. This is perhaps the most interesting puzzle we have encountered in this research. 
Differences in pricing strategies within the other industries discussed here seem 
mainly to reflect strategic choices. Symbian’s owners want to make money by selling 
smart– phone handsets, not by licensing the Symbian OS, while Microsoft wants to make 
money licensing its operating system. At the end of the day, of course, end– users 
purchase hardware/software bundles, and neither Symbian nor Microsoft intends to earn 
revenues from applications developers. Apple makes money on the iPod device (a 
hardware/software bundle), not on the music it buys and resells to iPod owners. NTT 
DoCoMo makes money on the network traffic generated by i– mode services, not by 
charging high prices for i– mode handsets or by levying access or usage fees on content 
developers. In these last two cases, alternative pricing strategies would be possible and, 
arguably, plausible—though they may not be optimal. 
4.3 Bundling and Feature Accretion 
There is a single, simple story to tell here: driven by advances in hardware 
technology, hardware and software platforms (as well as applications programs) have 
steadily added features and functionality. While this process has been most visible in PC 
operating systems, thanks to antitrust cases brought against Microsoft in the United States 
and elsewhere,
109 it is not obviously the most dramatic. Mobile phones, once capable only 
of placing and receiving voice telephone calls, have become smart phones with cameras, 
Internet browsers, instant messaging capability, and a host of other features and functions. 
Today’s PDAs are much more capable than the Apple Newton or even the first Palm 
Pilot. This advance has been supported by increasingly complex and capable operating 
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systems and applications programs, which are in turn made possible by increases in the 
power of the handheld platform. Video game platforms now include the ability to play 
DVDs and access the Internet. The market for PC modems has almost vanished, since 
modems are built into most new PCs—often along with Ethernet ports and wireless 
networking capability. 
As discussed at the outset, there is little mystery about what is going on here. 
Increases in hardware power make it possible for software to do more without undue 
sacrifice in speed. The earliest PCs were too slow to support a graphical user interface, 
for instance, while current models do so with ease. As disk storage has become cheaper, 
the cost of adding new features to an operating system or an applications program has 
fallen rapidly, and new features broaden product appeal. Many end– users agree that 
software is too complex. But there is much less agreement on what features should be 
dropped, and most users acknowledge that they simply ignore features they do not find 
valuable. Similarly, antitrust authorities who view product integration with suspicion are 
standing in the path of what seem to be strong and broad technology– driven trends. 
4.4 Concluding Observations 
As a general matter, forecasting the evolution of technology is hazardous business. 
Many technological wonders forecast with confidence a few decades ago have yet to 
appear on the market, while our everyday lives have been profoundly affected by 
innovations, like email and GPS navigation, that entered the world of commerce with 
little fanfare. Still, it is hard not to be confident that computer– based industries will grow 
in importance over at least the next few decades. Hardware performance is almost certain 
to rise even as machinery size falls; most information and entertainment can be reduced 
to digital content; and software is arguably the most flexible of creative media. 
This is good news for consumers—and, we would argue, for economists. The 
computer– based industries discussed here exhibit fascinating, rapidly changing patterns 
of product design, integration, and pricing. Many firms pursue interesting multi– sided 
platform strategies. As these industries evolve and others like them emerge, there will be 
much for economists to study and important lessons for us and for antitrust authorities to 
learn.    34
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